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STUDENT NOTE

Prior West Virginia Equity Practice Regarding
Necessary Joinder of Parties as Precedent under
Rule 19
Some writers have observed that Rule 19 of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure on necessary joinder of parties is simply
a continuation of former West Virginia equity practice and that
prior decisions will serve as precedents for both legal and equitable
claims under this Rule.' Similar observations have been made of
Federal Rule 19 and prior federal practice.' With the exception

ILuGAR & SrLVERsTExN, W. VA. Rui~s 170

(1960).
Mooi, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1905(1) (2d ed. 1964). "Subdivision
(a) of Rule 19 is a generalized statement concerning necessary and indispensable parties to be read in the light of cases at law and in equity. It was
not intended to change the rules governing compulsory joinder that had been
laid down in those cases. However, the observation has been made that
Federal Rule 19 was intended to liberalize the practice of joinder of parties
to the fullest extent compatible with doing justice between the parties in
interest. Greenleaf v. Safeway Trails, 140 F2d 889 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied 322 U.S. 736 (1944).
23

[53]
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of certain minor differences, West Virginia Rule 19 is identical to
its federal counterpart. This note is intended to examine some of
the many cases concerning necessary joinder of parties that have
been decided under the Federal Rules in light of prior West Virginia equity decisions involving similar factual situations. This
analysis hopefully will result in a workable and meaningful comprehension of the relationship between the two.'
Rule 19(a) provides that subject to Rule 23 (concerning class
actions)' and certain provisions of Rule 19(b), persons having a
joint interest shall be joined and made parties on the same side
as plaintiffs or defendants. The reporter's original note regarding
this section stated that Rule 19(a) applies to "indispensable'
parties or those without whom an action cannot proceed.'
Federal decisions have construed persons having a "joint interest"
as meaning those who would be necessary or indispensable parties
under the old practice6 and persons having an interest of such a
nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting
that interest or leaving the controversy in such condition that its
3 Rule 19 has been subject to severe criticism. Reed, Compulsory Joinder
of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 Mic. L. 1Ev. 327 (1957). Based upon alleged
shortcomings, a number of changes have been proposed in the wording of
the Federal Rule to "strengthen' it. The Advisory Committee's Note states
that, "experience has shown that the rule does not point clearly to the proper
basis of decision. The present rule does not state affirmatively what factors
are relevant in deciding whether the action should proceed or be dismissed
when joinder of interested persons is infeasible." Proposed Amendments to
Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts (Mar. 1964
Draft). It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss the merits of the
proposed changes. However, for a defense of the present rule and criticism
of the changes, see Fink, Indispensable Parties and Proposed Amendment to
FederalRule 19, 74 YALE L.J. 403 (1965).
4 Prior West Virginia equity practice had allowed the use of so-called
class suits when joinder was extremely difficult or inconvenient. Thus, a person
holding a common interest with numerous others was allowed to sue on behalf
of himself and the others without formally joining them in the suit. 1 HoGc,
EQUITY PRocEDUsRE § 43 (3d ed. 1943). Thus, ratepayers of alas utility
were allowed to bring a suit on behalf of many to question the legatity of the
rate and to recover the excess in Natural Gas Co. v. Sommerville, 113 W. Va.
100, 166 S.E. 852 (1932). In Standard Oil Co. v. Smith, 116 W. Va. 16, 178
S.E. 281 (1935), the West Virginia court held that because a contractor's
bond to secure payment to materialmen and laborers was a covenant for the
protection of a class, a member of the class could proceed for the benefit
of all. It also has been held that a taxpayer might seek an injunction on
behalf of himself and all other taxpayers similarly situated to enjoin the
collection of an illegal tax. Williams v. County Court of Grant Co., 26 W. Va.
488 (1885).
5 Lu AR & SJi.vERsTEwn, supranote 1.
6 Field v. True Comics, 89 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and
good conscience!
When Rule 19 (a) is read in conjunction with the modifying
language of Rule 19 (b),I which provides for the omission of
persons who are not indispensable parties, it becomes clear that
"persons having a joint interest" is intended to mean those without
whom the court cannot proceed. Rule 19 divides parties into three
classes according to their interest in the action: those who must be
made parties (indispensable), those who should be made parties
(necessary) and those who may be made parties (proper).' The
names given to the particular classes are different from those used
in prior West Virginia equity practice. However, an examination
of the categories will indicate no basic difference between the
classes other than terminology.
The first category is the "indispenable" party. An indispensable
party is a person having such an interest in the subject matter
of the controversy that a final decree cannot be made without
affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a situation
that its final determination may be inadequate.'" Under prior
West Virginia equity practice such person was termed "necessary:"I
The second category is designated "necessary" and consists of
"those who have an interest in the controversy, but whose interests
are separable and will not be directly affected by a decree rendered in their absence, which does full justice between the parties
before the court."' 2 Previously, in West Virginia, such parties
were termed "proper.1 3
7

Currier v. Currier, 1 F.R.D. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
Rule 19(b) "Effect of Failure to Join. When persons who are not indispensable, but who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded
between those already parties, have not been made parties and are subject to
the jurisdiction of the court as to both service of process and venue, the courtshall order them summoned to appear in the action. -The court, in its discretion may proceed in the action without making such persons parties, if its
jurisdiction over them as to either service of process or venue can be acquiredonly by their consent or voluntary appearance; provided, however, that the
judgment rendered in the action shall not affect the rights or liabilities of
absent persons, except as provided in Rule 23 (a)."
92 BARON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACrICE & PRocEDTmE § 511 (1961).
The terms used under the Federal Rules to designate classes are used in this
note; although, these terms were not used in the same context in prior West
Virginia decisions.
Ford v. Adkins, 39 F. Supp. 472, 474 (E.D. Ill.
1941).
"1 Hoc% EQurry PROCEDURE § 40 (3d ed. 1943).
12 2 BARoN & HOLrZOFF, supra note 9.
131 HoGe, supra note 11.
8
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"Proper" parties is the designation given the third category and
consists of persons having an interest in the subject matter of the
litigation which may be conveniently adjudicated, but who have
no legal interest in the controversy between the immediate litigants and whose joinder is permitted but not required.' Under
prior West Virginia practice such parties were called "formal"' or
"nominal.""
It has been long recognized that there is no precise or universal
test to determine when a person's interest is such as to make him
an "indispensable" party or merely a "necessary" party.'6 The
wording of Rule 19 does not establish an exact standard. However,
Professor Moore observes that in spite of the large number of cases
that have arisen in this area, the governing principles have remained comparatively simple and constant.'7 Certainly, the name
assigned a particular class does not determine joinder. The primary
elements to be considered are the relationship of the parties to the
pending action and the effect such action has upon their rights.
The indispensability rule not only attempts to prevent interested
persons not before the court from litigating their rights, but also
seeks to protect the parties presently before the court and society
in general from repetitious, abortive and vexatious litigation.' 8
Based on the above judicial definitions of parties, an examination
of some of the precedents in prior West Virginia equity practice
will disclose the manner in which these precedents are compatible
with similar situations decided under Federal Rule 19.
A fruitful source of joinder problems concerns persons having
an interest in the same property. In a partition action involving
restricted Indian land decided under the Federal Rules, a federal
court stated, "Part owners or co-tenants in real estate are indispensable parties in an action for partition as there can be no proper,
& HoLzorr, supra note 9.
- 1 HoGG, supra note 11.
I.1 Hoc, supra note 11.
' 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 19.07 (2d ed. 1964).

' 2 BARON

The principles

set forth in the leading case of Shields v. Borrow, 17 How. (58 U. S.) 130
(1854), remain the bases of today's joinder classifications.

I"Fink, Indispensable Parties and Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule
19, 74 YAI_ L. J. 403 (1965). The United States Supreme Court has observed
that a holder of property is deprived of due process of law if he is compelled

to relinquish it without assurance that he will not be held liable again in another jurisdiction or in a suit brought by another claimant who is not bound
by the first judgment. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368
U. S. 71 (1961).
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complete, or conclusive division or accounting without their actual
or constructive presence."' 9 Under early West Virginia equity practice, it was error not to make persons parties to an action where
an uncertainty existed as to whether or not they had interests in
land to be partitioned. 0 In a partition action against a guardian
involving lands in which infants were part owners, the infants were
not referred to except incidentally as the wards of their guardian.
The incidental reference to the wards was insufficient to make
the infants parties to the suit, and because they were not parties,
their rights could not be adjudicated. The court held that a decree
of partition rendered in a suit in which all the persons interested
were not parties was void.2' Following the same reasoning, a
federal case held that in an action to partition personal property
all persons having interests or liens on the property were indispensable parties and should have been joined as parties plaintiffs or
defendants. 2
In a controversy involving two sets of lessees of the same property, it was held that co-tenants interested under either one or
both of the leases were "indispensable" parties to the action because their rights could have been materially affected by the
outcome. Also, where the lessee of an oil and gas lease brought
suit against the lessees of an adjoining tract to prevent them from
trespassing upon plaintiffs' land and prohibit the drilling of a
well on property claimed by both parties, all persons having
interests in the oil and gas which might be produced were "indispensable" parties.2 4 Similarly, a federal case held that where the
lessor of oil, gas and mineral rights sued to cancel the lease and
the lease-holder counterclaimed to confirm it, royalty grantees to
whom the lessor had granted interests in the royalties reserved in
the lease were indispensable. The court stated royalty grantees'
relation to the controversy was so direct and vital that no adequate
judgment could be entered without affecting their interest.2" It
has been held that, "Under the Federal Rules, a court cannot
adjudicate rights under conflicting oil leases of the same property
executed by different lessors, and each providing for the payment
v. United States, 138 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1943).
Donahue v. Fackler, 21 W. Va. 124 (1882).
Oneal v. Stimson, 61 W. Va. 551, 56 S.E. 889 (1907).

19 Grisso
20

21
22 Martin v. Better Taste Popcorn Co., 89 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
23
24

25

Pyle v. Henderson, 55 W. Va. 122, 46 S.E. 791 (1904).

Steelsmith v. Fisher Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 391, 35 S.E. 15 (1900).
Calcote v. Texas Pacific Coal &Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1946).
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of royalty, in a suit by the lessee to which the lessors are not
parties. The court stated that the test of indispensability is
whether the absent party's interest in the subject matter of the
litigation is such that no decree can be entered which will do
justice to the parties actually before the court without injuriously
affecting rights of absent parties." In a suit to cancel an oil and
gas lease, in which a decision in favor of the lessors would result
in terminating the lease and denying non-participating royalty
holders their rights to royalties under the lease, the royalty holders
were indispensable. The court stated that, "if a judgment effectively precludes them [the royalty holders] from enforcing their
rights and they are injuriously affected by the judgment, they
are indispensable.""
The West Virginia court has held that in a suit to cancel a
cloud. upon title to real estate, all parties who have or claim any
interest, right or title under the instrument or instruments of
writing sought to be cancelled are indispensable.28 Under the
Federal Rules, if an action seeks to cancel a muniment of title
or all relevant muniments of title, the court may not proceed to
grant relief if any persons interested are not before the court. 9
Where trust property has been involved in litigation, the West
Virginia court has generally held the trustee, as well as the beneficiary, to be an "indispensable" party."0 However, in a suit to
charge a debt upon property, encumbered by mortgages to secure
large issues of bonds in which the trustees were clothed with
ample powers to protect and enforce the rights of the bondholders, it was held unnecessary to make the bondholders parties
because the trustees fully represented them.3" The West Virginia
court has indicated that there are instances in which the beneficiaies in a deed of trust, where the trustees are given full power
and authority to do whatever is necessary to protect the rights
of the parties, may not be indispensable parties to a suit seeking

Lawrence v. Sun Oil Co., 166 F.2d 466, 469 (5th Cir. 1948).
Hilton v. Atlantic Refining Co., 327 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1964).
8 Bonafede v. Grafton Feed & Storage Co., 81 W. Va. 313, 94 S.E. 471
(1917).
29
Tardan v. California Oil Co., 323 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1963).
30 Beckwith v. Laing, 66 W. Va. 246, 66 S.E. 354 (1909).
" Billmyer Lumber Co. v. Merchants Coal Co., 66 W. Va. 696, 66 S.E.
1073 (1910).
26
27

2
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to affect the interest created by the trust deed. 2 A federal case
has stated that the result is uniform that beneficiaries need not
be joined when the trustee himself sues a third party with reference
to the trust property. The reason is that the trustee can adequately
represent the beneficiaries' interests." However, the federal courts
have developed the rule that when a beneficiary sues a trustee
who has an adverse interest all beneficiaries are indispensable if
the object of the action is to benefit not merely a particular beneficiary but the entire corpus. This rule is said to rest on practical
considerations. Thus, it has been stated:
The refusal to allow a beneficiary of a trust or a legatee of a
will to assert against his trustee or executor a claim benefiting
the entire corpus unless all the co-beneficiaries are joined
reflects considerations of fairness, for even if the defendant
won he might be forced to litigate a second time.34
West Virginia decisions have followed this same reasoning. Thus,
in a suit brought by one or more distributees or general legatees of
a decedent's estate for settlement and the recovery by the plaintiff
of his distributive share, not only the administrator, but also all
he distributees or general legatees were considered indispensable
parties." However, a contrary conclusion was reached in an early
federal case decided prior to the adoption of the present Rules.
The legatees in a will were allowed to sue the executor to compel
an accounting as their interests were severable and a decree
without prejudice to the rights of other parties could be made.36
On the other hand, in an action decided under the Rules to
recover for damages caused by the defendant's failure to account
for property entrusted to him by the defendant's father, an absent
heir was considered an indispensable party. Here, the complaint
revealed that no probate proceedings had occurred respecting the
estate and also showed that another heir had a nonseverable
interest with the plaintiffs'."
The courts have recognized, both at common law and under
the Rules, that joint obligees are indispensable in an action on a
32 Maynard v. Shein, 83 WV.
Va. 508, 98 S.E. 618 (1919). This is dicta,
however, because the trustee under the deed had only a bare power of sale
and the beneficiaries were held to be indispensable parties.
Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959).
Stevens v. Loomis, 223 F. Supp. 534, 538 (D.C. Mass. 1963), aff'd,
334 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1964).
35
Woodyard v. Buffington, 23 W. Va. 195 (1883).
36
Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall (84 U. S.) 570 (1873).
17 Crutcher v. Joyce, 134 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1943).
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contract. In a West Virginia case involving a contract to pay a
sum of money" to two persons, the court held that both parties
must unite in an action for its breach; and when one sues alone
the non-joinder of the other is fatal. The court reasoned that when
the interests were joint, and several parties were permitted to
bring actions for the same cause, itwould be difficult to determine
which of them should have the judgment.3 8 Likewise, where a
contract provided for payment to landowners for the right to build
a road through their land for an agreed sum, the contract was
held to be for payment to joint obligees. Here, there was a single
convenant in which the obligees were jointly identified. The court
considered all parties indispensable to an action on the contract. 9
An action was brought under the Rules to recover a commission
for obtaining a loan on the theory of quantum meruit rather than
on the express contract. As the commission was jointly owed to
both the plaintiff and another, the other person was considered
an indispensable party. The court reasoned that, "Obligors have a
"right to stand upon their contract and insist that they shall not
be harassed with different actions or suits to recover parts of one
single demand'." °
The observation has been made that this particular requirement
works no hardship because an obligee who refuses to join in the
action may be named as a defendant or an involuntary plaintiff."
The provision in Rule 19 (a) allowing the joinder of a reluct. ,t
plaintiff as a defendant or, in a proper case, as an involuntary
plaintiff is a technique long recognized in West Virginia equity
practice."2 Equity allowed this because
in equity . . . it is generally held to be sufficient if all
persons interested in the subject matter of the cause be made
parties thereto, either as plaintiffs or defendants. In equity
all parties to a suit are, or may be, actors therein without
regard to the formal positions on the record, . . . for the

court can make such decree as the exigencies of the case
may require.43
38 Sandusky v. NVest Fork Oil & Natural Gas Co., 63 W. Va. 260, 59 S.E.
1082 39(1907).
Hatfield v.Cabell County Court, 75 W. Va.595, 84 S.E. 335 (1915).
40
Bry-Man's Inc. v.Stute, 312 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir. 1963).
4, 2 BARON & HOL2ZOFF, FED
L PRAlncE & PROCEDURE § 513.2

(1961).

42 1 HocG, EQurry PRocEDuRE
43 Sadler v. Taylor, 49 W. Va.

90 (3d ed. 1943).
104, 115, 38 S.E. 583, 587 (1901).
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As indicated above, there is no precise or universal test to
determine indispensability, 44 nor is it likely that a standard can
be devised to determine in every situation whether a party will
clearly fall into one category or another. However, an early
federal case formulated a series of guidelines which are often
quoted and appear to establish a useful set of standards, namely:
(1) Is the interest of the absent party distinct and severable?
(2) In the absence of such party, can the court render
justice between the parties before it? (3) Will the decree
made, in the absence of such party, have no injurious effect
on the interest of such absent party? (4) Will the final
determination, in the absence of such party, be consistent with
equity and good conscience?
If, after the court determines that an absent party is
interested in the controversy, it finds all of the four questions
outlined above are answered in the affirmative with respect
to the absent party's interest, then such absent party is a
necessary party. However, if any one of the four questions
is answered in the negative, then the absent party is indispensable.4"
The few cases reviewed in this article do not represent an
exhaustive and comprehensive examination of prior West Virginia
practice. However, the article's purpose has been accomplished
if it has been satisfactorily demonstrated that present West Virginia Rule 19 creates no basic departure from prior equity practice regarding indispensable parties. Thus, the old equity standard
requiring joinder of parties will still apply whenever it appears
that persons not parties to the cause are materially interested in
the subject matter or have rights that will be affected by the
decree.46 Precedents and the nature of the parties' interests must
be analyzed to provide the best possible guidelines in determining
how a judgment may affect these interests.
David Gail Hanlon

44 1 Hoco, supra note 11.
11
46 Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 427-428 (9th Cir. 1936).
Bristow v. Tyler, 82 W. Va. 629, 96 S.E. 1052 (1918).
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